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THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
COURTS of every nation recognize the immunity 1 of a foreign sovereign. 2 This
limitation upon their jurisdiction originated in an era of personal sovereignty
when the domestic ruler was above the law.3 Failure to grant similar treat-
ment to a foreign prince indicated either hostility or superiority. In order to
avoid friction that might result from offending the dignity of another sover-
eign, the local state exempted him from its jurisdiction.4 The claims of in-
dividuals were sacrificed in the national interest.
In The Exchange,5 Chief Justice Marshall firmly emplanted foreign sover-
eign immunity in American law. American owners of the schooner Exchange
sued to recover the vessel while it lay in Philadelphia harbor. It had been
seized abroad by Napoleonic agents, who converted it into a French warship.
Plaintiff's claimed that "[e]very person ... who is entitled to property brought
within the jurisdiction of our courts, has a right to assert his title in those
1. This comment is concerned primarily with the immunity from American judicial
jurisdiction which foreign sovereigns enjoy for themselves and their property. Jurisdic-
tional immunity should be distinguished from the immunity from execution granted to the
property of foreign sovereigns. For brief treatment of the latter, see notes 111-116 infra
and accompanying text.
For the views of other countries on the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states, see
Draft Convention of the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J.
INT'L L. 451, 527-540, 572-645 (Supp. 1932) (hereinafter cited as HARVARD Rs=]tcui) ;
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BaMT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 250-272 (1951.) (hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT). For discussion of the
various means by which a state may be held to waive this immunity, see HARVAR" RE-
SEARCH, supra at 508-527, 540-572; Dickinson, Waiver of State Immunity, 19 Am. J.
INT'L L. 555 (1925).
2. The terms "sovereign," "government," and "state" are used synonymously in this
comment.
"It is unanimously admitted that the courts of one State have no jurisdiction over an-
other State when the foreign State is sued for acts accomplished by it in the exercise of
its sovereign rights." 9 Matsuda Report on Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign
States (Committee of Experts, Progressive Codification of International Law, League of
Nations) 6 (1927) ; also cited in 22 Ama. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1928).
3. "Historically the rule may be traced to a time when most States were ruled by
personal sovereigns who, in a very real sense, personified the State-'L'Etat, c'est mot.'"
HARvARD RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 527. The common law maxim that the King can
do no wrong expressed the absolute nature of sovereign power. Its roots lay in the
Roman idea of a personal, imperial despot. Sanborn, The Immunity of Merchant Vessels
When Owned By Foreign Governments, 1 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 5 (1926). See Feather v.
The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 295 (1865) ; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 232.
4. In this era of personal rule, "influenced by the survival of the principle of feudal-
ism, the exercise of authority on the part of one sovereign over another inevitably indi-
cated either the superiority of overlordship or the active hostility of an equal. The peace-
ful intercourse of States could be predicated only on the basis of respect for other sov-
ereigns." HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 527.
5. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
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courts. . ". ."6 But the Supreme Court found that until the United States
exercised its complete territorial power "in a manner not to be misunder-
stood,' 7 it promised impliedly to exempt visiting sovereigns from its jurisdic-
tion. And the Court held that the immunity of the sovereign person ex\tended
to the sovereign's public armed vessels. To hold otherwise, it said, would
affect the power and degrade the dignity of the foreign sovereign.8
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity announced in The Exchange
assumes great importance in the twentieth century." The entry by govern-
ments into many previously private pursuits 10 and the rapid expansion of
international intercourse have created many new occasions for its application.
And courts, which have become increasingly sensitive to the impact of foreign
affairs, have applied the doctrine to these new situations in order to avoid
international friction."'
On the other hand, growing recognition of individual rights militates against
a principle that denies redress for wrongs done to private persons' - Recon-
6. Id. at 146-7.
7. Id. at 146.
8. Id. at 144. The Chief Justice stated that the foreign ministers and the troops in
transit of a foreign prince were also entitled to immunity. Id. at 138-9.
9. For discussion of the doctrine's developments, see Riesenfeld, Sovercign Im:uity
of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: the Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 Mi:;.
L. R 1 (1940).
10. The Supreme Court acknowledged this in The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926),
where it granted immunity to a merchant ship owned and operated by the Italian Govern-
ment. In discussing the failure of The Exchange to include such vessels within the privi-
leged category, the Court said "the omission is not of special significance, for in 1812,
when the decision was given, merchant ships were operated only by private owners, and
there was little thought of governments engaging in such operations. That came much
later." Id. at 573. See also The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
11. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (immunity of govern-
ment merchant vessel); The laipo, 259 Fed. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (same) ; French Re-
public v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923) (immunity from taxation
of government tobacco). This concern for international amity is often summarized by the
term "comity" See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1937) ; The
Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 518; Riesenfeld, supra note 9, at 3 n.12.
12. Most commentators agree that immunity must somehow be curbed rather than ex-
tended, in keeping with the trend toward achievement of "the rule of law." See the au-
thorities cited in Bishop, Ncza, U;ited States Policy Limiting Socrcign Immu nity, 47
Am. J. I'xTL L. 93, 96 n.13 (1953). Professor Lauterpacht has stated that modern de-
velopments in the social and economic sphere represent "a challenge to the prerogatives
of the sovereign state which denies to th individual legal remedies for the vindication of
his rights as against the state in the matter both of cuntract and tort...." LAurup'Acirr,
28 Brt. Y.B. INTL L. 220 (1951). Another writer has said that the state should be as
subject to the law as is the individual, for the tort of a government official "must shoz:!
the collective conscience of the community as much as the tort of any other individual."
Sanborn, supra note 3, at 8-9. See also Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicatcd One of
Its F, wions?, 40 Am. J. I-r'L L. 16S (1946).
Judicial concern for individual rights is more often counterbalanced by fear of em-
barrassing the conduct of foreign relations through denial of immunity. See text at notes
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ciliation of the policy of avoiding international friction with the policy of en-
hancing individual satisfactions presents a challenge which the courts have
failed to meet.13
THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN APPROACH
American courts have followed the "absolute theory" of immunity, which
grants immunity in all cases where a sovereign is defendant.14 But they have
attempted to limit the applicability of this theory by restricting their definition
of what constitutes suit against a sovereign. 5 In actions in rent against sov-
ereign property, immunity has been denied where the foreign government is
not in possession of the property. And in suits against a sovereign agency,
immunity has been denied where the agency is a corporation.
Ships
Almost all in ren actions brought against foreign sovereign property are in
admiralty, and the most significant decisions in the evolution of the sovereign
immunity doctrine have concerned ships. Traditionally, a ship has received
immunity only if it is in possession of a foreign government 10 when suit is
38-56 infra. But enlightened judges occasionally acknowledge the undesirable conse-
quences of granting immunity. "The immunity of the sovereign may well become a serious
injustice to the citizen, if it can be claimed in the multitude of cases arising from govern-
mental activities which are increasing so fast." Gould Coupler Co. v. U.S.S.B.E.F.C., 261
Fed. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). See also Republic of China v. Nat. City Bank, 208 F.2d
627, 630 (2d Cir. 1953); The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). And some
courts recognize that immunity provides sovereign commercial instrumentalities with an
unfair advantage over private competitors. See the opinion of Lord Maugham in The
Cristina [1938] A.C. 485, 521,
For the nineteenth century view exalting sovereign immunity, see the opinions of
Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1921) ; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). In Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318 (1925), Justice Holmes
recognized that "public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the sov-
ereign has changed."
13. For recognition of this judicial dilemma, see Deik, The Pica of Sovere(qn fin-
inunity and the New York Court of Appeals, 40 COL. L. REv. 453, 464 (1940) ; Riesen-
feld, supra note 9, at 65.
14. 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984 (1952). See Fensterwald, Sovereigqn Innunily and
Soviet State Trading, 63 HARv. L. REv. 614, 617-18 (1950) ; LAUTE1PACIIT, supra note
12, at 268; Friedmann, The Growth of State Control Over the Individual, and its Effect
upon the Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BaiT. Y.B. INI'L L. 118, 124
(1938).
15. See Fensterwald, supra note 14, at 618 et seq.
16. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) ; The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). See
note 18 infra for some of the lower court cases in a long line tracing back to Long v. The
Tampico, 16 Fed. 491. (S.D.N.Y. 1883). In that case the requirement of foreign govern-
mental possession was arrived at by analogizing to the Supreme Court's doctrine with re-
spect to the immunity of United States property. Id. at 496.
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filed.1 7 "Title" in the government has not been sufficient,18 despite its vigorous
representations of immunity.19 The rationale offered for this distinction is that
jurisdiction over the ship is not jurisdiction over its sovereign in the absence
of "possession." 20
But, because of its ambiguity, "possession" is a most unsatisfactory standard
for deciding questions of immunity.21 For example, an executive decree of the
Spanish Republican Government purported to requisition the steamship Nave-
War 22 while it was on the high seas. Spanish consuls in Argentine ports en-
17. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 40 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 119 F2d 1022 (2d
Cir. 1941) (immunity denied where the vessel was libelled prior to the date for which
possession was scheduled).
18. E.g., The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (V.D. Wash. 1946); The Liubica Mat-
kovic, 49 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ; The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 2-8 (D. Mass. 1941) ;
The Johnson Lighterage Co., 231 Fed. 365 (D.NJ. 1916). Also see cases cited nfte 16
Indeed, "title" does not even appear to be a prerequisite to immunity in American
courts. They have treated vessels whose use was requisitioned in the same manner as those
owned by foreign governments. "Possession" has been required in both classes of cases.
See The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) ; The Attualita, 238 Fed. 969 (4th Cir. 1916) ; The
Katingo Hadjipatera, 40 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 119 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1941).
English courts take a different view of the significance of "possession,' "title," and
"requisition," granting immunity when any one of the three is found in a foreign govern-
ment. See the opinion of Lord Wright in The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 507.
It is, of course, realized that words such as "title" and "possession" are highly ambigu-
ous. They refer not to facts but to legal consequences, i.e., official responses to facts. For
illustration, see text at notes 21-24 infra.
19. For the determined efforts of the Spanish Republic to obtain immunity for one of
its vessels, see The Navemar, 17 F. Supp. 495, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); 18 F. Supp. 153
(E.D.N.Y. 1937) ; 90 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1937) ; 303 U.S. 63 (193) ; 24 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.
N.Y. 1938) ; 102 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1939). See also notes 22-24 infra and accmp3nying
text.
20. "Property does not necessarily become a part of the sovereignty beause it is
owned by the sovereign. To make it so, it must be devoted to the public use, and must be
employed in carring on the operations of the government" WNaite, C.J. in The Fidelity,
8 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1191, No. 4,758 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879). See The Annette; The Drm,
[11919] P. 105, 111, where the court said: "If it is not in posscssion, the C, urt interferes
with no sovereign right of the government by arresting the vessel, nor des it, by arrest-
ing the vessel, compel the govermnt to submit to the jurisdiction or to abandn its
possession."
21. See the concurring opinion uf justice Frankfurter in 'Me:dco v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 38 (1945). "[P]ossession is tou tenuous a distinction on the basis of which to differea-
tiate between foreign government-owned vessels engaged merely in trade that are immune
from suit and those that are not. Possession, actual or constructive, is a legal concept full
of pitfalls. Even where only private interests are involved, the determination of psseesi n,
as bankruptcy cases, for instance, abundantly prove, engenders much confusion and con-
flict. Ascertainment of what constitutes possession or where it is, is too subtle and pre-
carious a task for transfer to a field in which international interests and susceptibilities
are involved." Id. at 39-40. See also Riesenfcld, S6v'rcign Inmunity of Forcijn Ig esseds
in AWlo-A mzrican Law: the Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 Mi:z. L Rnv. 1, 55-6
(1940).
22. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
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dorsed on both the ship's roll and its register that it had become state prop-
erty. And its master obeyed consular orders to notify Madrid that the Consul
General had authorized him to sail to New York. Yet, when the vessel was
subsequently libelled in the United States and the Spanish Ambassador claimed
immunity, the Supreme Court denied that these acts met the test of posses-
sion.2 3 That test was held to require ".. . some act of physical dominion or
control ... or at least some recognition on the part of the ship's officers that
they were controlling the vessel and crew in behalf of their government.
'24
And even if "possession" were not so tenuous, its use as a distinguishing
factor would still be undesirable. The indignity and the inconvenience of sub-
mitting to the local jurisdiction when the foreign state has only title are often
no less than when it has possession, 25 particularly since "possession" need not
be physical.2 6 The need for immunity, if any, would seem equal in both in-
stances.
Furthermore, basing immunity on "possession" invites states to deprive
private parties of their remedies by resort to readily available devices. For
instance, it would probably suffice to place a junior naval officer on a mer-
chant vessel.2 7  And, on the authority of The Naventar,28 mere symbolic




Traditional doctrine grants immunity to government agencies, commissions,
and other instrumentalities unless they have corporate personality.30 The
23. Id. at 75-6. The Court reversed the Second Circuit, which considered these facts
to be evidence of possession and control and which held that they constituted at least con-
structive possession. The Navemar, 90 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1937).
24. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-6 (1938). It is difficult to understand how the
facts of this case failed to satisfy the Court's test.
25. The Navemar provides an example. See note 19 supra; and see notes 22-24 supra
and accompanying text.
26. See text at note 24 supra. Although Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), is
often cited for the proposition that possession must be "actual," the Court did 11ot purport
to decide the nature of the possession requisite to immunity. The question before it was
whether or not mere title in the government was sufficient to warrant immunity. See text
at notes 49-51 infra. The Court gave no indication of altering the test of possession laid
down in The Navemar. On the contrary, it relied on that decision as authority for its
holding. Id. at 37. It is noteworthy that Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion
attacked the Court's use of possession, actual or constructive, as a test of immunity. Id.
at 40.
27. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 40 (1945).
He added, somewhat cryptically, that "certainly, the terms of the financial arrangement by
which the commercial enterprise before the Court is carried out can readily be varied with-
out much change in substance to manifest a relation to the ship by Mexico which could
not easily be deemed to disclose a want of possession by Mexico." Ibid.
28. See text at note 24 supra.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. For cases where immunity was granted to unincorporated government instrumen-
[Vol. 63 :11481.152
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rationale for thus distinguishing between incorporated and unincorporated
government agencies appears to be based upon the corporation's conceptually
independent existence. 31 Hence, a suit against the corporation is not usually
considered to be a suit against the government which it serves.3 2
But non-incorporation is just as unsatisfactory a criterion for granting im-
munity as is "possession." Any affront to sovereign prestige or interference
with government operations would appear to be the same whether judicial
authority is exercised over incorporated or unincorporated agencies.3 And
this test permits no distinction between cases where an agency's immunity may
talities, see, e.g., Oliver Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F2d 659 (2d Cir.), afftd, 264 U.S. 440
(1924); French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.MV. 124 (1924);
Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876 (1903). Cf. Dexter &
Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930) (immunity from exe-
cution granted to the property of Swedish national railroad). For cases where immunity
was denied because the government agency was a corporation, see e.g., Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Commissioner, 65 F2d 583 (2d Cir. 1953); Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P. 1934); The Uxmial, 40 F. Supp. 253 (D.
Mass. 1941) ; United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndik-at Gesellscdaft, 31 F2d 199 (S.D.X.Y.
1929) ; Coale v. Socit6 Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
Contra: In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R-D. 220 (D.D.C. 1952) ; Brad-
ford v. Dir. Gen. of Railroads of Mexico, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See
Article 26 of the H. a~vARD RESEAXRcH, 26 Am. J. INT'L L 451 (Supp. 1932): "A State
need not accord the privileges and immunities provided for in this Convention to such
juristic persons as corporations or associations for profit separately organized by or under
the authority of another State, regardless of the nature and extent of governmental in-
terest therein or control thereof." Id. at 716.
The criterion of non-incorporation in cases of foreign sovereign immunity was b_,rrowedt
from case law concerning the immunity of agencies created by states of the Unitcd States.
See Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257 (U.S. 1837) ; Bank uf Kentucky v. Wister,
2 Pet. 318 (U.S. 1829); Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 9 Wheat. 904
(U.S. 1824).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F2d 199, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); Coale v. Soci't6 Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F2d 1S9, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) ; Ulen v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1,7, 24 N.Y.S.2d
201, 206 (2d Dep't 1940). "The courts will not usually tear aside the corp irate veil, king
for the most part eager to avoid the inequitable consequences of skvereignty. A distinc-
tion is therefore drawn between the corporate entity and the state, even thiough the lattcr
owns all the stock." Jessup and DeMk, Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglid Jur:zrgsv-
relsen et al, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 335, 338 (1931).
32. "A suit against a corporation is not a suit against a government merely because it
has been incorporated by direction of the government, and is used as a governmental al'rt,
and its stock is owned solely by the government." United States v. Deutsches Ialis n-
dikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
33. See In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 2,0 (D.D.C. 1952),
where the court deviated from the general rule and granted immunity to the Anglv-Iran-
ian Oil Co., a government-controlled corporation. It found that the pulicy favoring s ,v-
ereign immunity in other circumstances was equally applicable here. "There is the same
necessity for reciprocal rights of immunity, the same feeling of injured pride if juriadic-
tion is sought to be exercised, the same risk of belligerent actiun if government prup rty
is subsequently seized or injured." Id. at 291. Professor Hyde has stated that: "Whu a
suit against an entity or commission or agency is in substance a suit against a foreign
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be important to its government and cases where it would be of little concern1
4
Moreover, a standard which emphasizes form lends itself to evasion. With no
great difficulty, a state may create a variety of entities which resemble cor-
porations and which may yet retain immunity.30
Thus, judicial efforts to restrict the applicability of the absolute theory re-
veal a highly conceptual approach which fails to satisfy either of the policies
competing for consideration." This approach does not always avoid embar-
rassment to foreign relations, nor does it aid many individuals injured by other
State on whose behalf and by whose authority it acts, a reason for exemption from the
local jurisdiction is seen." 1 HYDE, INTMENATIONAL LAW 814 (2d Rev. ed. 1945).
34. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, m.pra note 33. The court
found that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., although a corporation, was fulfilling a function
vital to the security of Great Britain by supplying that nation with oil for its defenses
against aggression. Id. at 290-1.
35. See Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels it; Anglo-American Law:
the Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 MINN. L. Rzv. 1, 56 n.215 (1940), where the
author discusses this possibility with respect to ships: "The legal forms in which a state
can own and operate a vessel are multifold. It may be the sole owner of all the stock of
an ordinary private corporation; it may incorporate specifically for that purpose, but the
corporate structure being similar to an ordinary corporation; it may set up completely
new forms of public corporations for that purpose; finally, it may create just 'separate
governmental agencies or departments.'" See also Friedmann, The Growvth of State Con-
trol Over the Individual, and its Effect upon the Rules of International Responsibililty, 19
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 118, 130 (1938).
36. Even sophisticated courts tend to lose sight of some of the policy considerations in
sovereign immunity problems. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1941). There, a private citizen sued two states of the United States of Brazil for prin-
cipal and interest on bonds issued by defendants, attaching their New York bank accounts.
Brazil claimed immunity for these funds because judicial process would interfere with its
regulation of foreign exchange to be used by the states to meet defaulted foreign obliga-
tions. The Second Circuit declined to grant immunity on this ground because it would
immunize "property in this country from attachment for a debt due here merely on the
assertion of a foreign sovereign, not of title or a recognized property interest, but of a plan
for rationing foreign exchange." Id. at 359. But it did grant immunity on the ground
that the Brazilian states occupy in Brazil a status similar to that of our own states in the
United States. Since these latter enjoy immunity in cases not covered by the Eleventh
Amendment, Judge Clark said it was not only "natural and reasonable," but also necessary
for friendly international intercourse to grant the Brazilian states a similar privilege. Ibid.
The premise that amicable relations require the United States to grant immunity to
foreign states and their subdivisions in situations where it asserts immunity for itself and
its subdivisions seems valid. See notes 96-7 infra and accompanying text. But rejection
of the rationale upon which Brazil claimed immunity sets a poor precedent for cases where
equality of treatment would not require immunity. Few matters are more important to the
modern nation than regulation of the .public debt and control of foreign exchange. Yet the
Second Circuit's test would subject such matters to judicial process whenever the con-
stitutional position of a foreign political subdivision is unlike that of our own states. Id.




governments. If international expediency were the sole standard, immunity
would be granted whenever a foreign state claimed it. For the denial of im-
munity serves to embarrass that state whether or not its claim is justified
according to traditional technicalities. If maximization of individual satisfac-
tions were the only consideration, immunity would be denied in every case.
Traditional American doctrine does not represent a functional compromise
between these logical extremes.
3 7
EXECUTIVE PREDOMINANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In a series of opinions from 1938 to 1945, 38 the Supreme Court introduced
a period of transition which has not yet terminated in a clear and rational
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court reemphasized the importance of
avoiding international friction. And, in order to implement this policy, it
stated that courts, in determining questions of immunity, should defer to "the
department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions." 39 The implications of executive predominance are not yet certain.
In upholding the district court's refusal to be bound by the Spanish Am-
bassador's allegations of immunity in The Navcmar;10 the Court declared by
way of dictum that "[i]f the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive
branch of the government it is then the duty of the court to release the
vessel ... ." But it held that, since the State Department had declined to
37. For a similar conclusion, see Fenstervald, Sovereign Iununity a:d Soztct State
Trading, 63 HAgv. L. REv. 614, 620 (1950). The implitic nature of this traditit nal ap-
proach is most vividly illustrated by cases where private litigants were denied access to tie
courts in order to preserve friendly relations with a government at war with the United
States, Telkes v. Hungarian National Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 33 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Ist
Dep't 1942) ; with a government no longer in existence, Nankivel v. OmA: All-Russian
Government, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569 (1923) ; and with a government nt recognizcd
by the United States, Vulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y.
372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
38. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 6S (193S) ; Ex Pare Peru, 313 U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
39. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ; Ex Parle Peru, 318 U.S. 57Sq, E5 S
(1943).
40. 303 U.S. 68 (1938). See notes 22-4 supra and accompanying text.
41. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 63, 74 (1938) (emphasis supplied). A foreign state that
wishes to assert immunity may do so by appearing in court for that purl.re tr C.
ing the State Department. Both methods are often employed in the same tca-e. WhL-t
State Department aid is requested, the Department may or may nut ta':e acti.n. 'When it
chooses to act, it usually transmits the request of the foreign government alvng vith its
own statement to the Attorney-General, who then directs the district attorney to present
these statements to the court See Feller, Procedure in Cases ln'cCfviug l;;::f::it; I
Foreign States in Courts of the United States, 25 Am1. J. IxL L. 83 (1931).
Prior to The ANavemar, the State Department's reactions to requests for immunity
ranged from express disapproval of the claim, to inaction, to bare certification of the state's
status as a recognized sovereign, to a request for respectful consideration of the s*, '. erdin's
claim, to acceptance of the truthfulness of the facts asserted by the foreign state, to reze.g-
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intercede in behalf of the Spanish Republic, the question was open to judicial
inquiry.
42
In Ex Parte Per 4 3 the Court dispelled doubts about the meaning of its
Navemar dictum by holding that executive "recognition and allowance" con-
stitutes a "conclusive determination" requiring courts to surrender jurisdic-
tion.44 It issued a writ of prohibition to the district court, which had refused
to release a Peruvian vessel despite "recognition and allowance." Chief Justice
Stone stated that judicial deference to executive action was ". . . founded upon
the policy ... that our national interest will be better served in such cases if
the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a friendly power, are
righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsion of judi-
cial proceedings.
'4 5
This doctrine of "recognition and allowance" limited the applicability of
traditional criteria such as "possession" and non-incorporation, but it did not
render them inoperative. In Ex Parte Pern the Court was careful to repeat
that, in the absence of executive approval of immunity, courts were free to
decide the jurisdictional question.
40
Mexico v. Hoffman
But Mexico v. Hoffman 47 has cast doubt upon whether or not these tradi-
tional tests retain any contemporary vitality. The owner of an American fish-
ing vessel libelled a merchant ship whose title was in the Mexican Govern-
ment. Mexico asserted immunity and persuaded the State Department to file
nition of the validity of the claim, to an affirmative demand for dismissal of the suit. See
Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestion" and Certificate of the American State De-
partment, 24 BARIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.16 (1947). Judicial treatment of these various utter-
ances fluctuated, but, until The Navemar, the courts always retained at least verbal inde-
pendence of the executive with respect to immunity.
The Supreme Court's dictum in Navemar, providing for automatic dismissal of a suit
upon executive "recognition and allowance," added to the confusion surrounding the inter-
pretation and the significance of State Department communications, For a classic example,
see Sullivan v. Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1941), the substantive aspects of which are discussed in note 36 supra. See also Deik,
The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals, 40 COL. L. REv.
453 (1940).
42. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). The Department refused to take any action
whatsoever in the case, advising the Ambassador of his Government's rights to appear
directly before the court to make its plea. Id. at 71.
43. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
44. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). This decision cleared up much of both
the procedural and the substantive confusion compounded by The Navenar. The Court's
emphasis upon "recognition and allowance" gave these words the status of a formula. And
its holding left no uncertainty as to its view that executive use of this formula would bind
the courts on questions of law as well as on questions of fact.
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 587-8.
47. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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two "suggestions" with the court, but neither "suggestion" purported to "rec-
ognize and allow" the claim. 48 The district court found that the ship was in
possession of a private company and denied immunity. After the Ninth
Circuit affirmed5 0 certiorari was granted to decide whether or not, in the
absence of government possession, M\exico's title to the ship was sufficient to
warrant immunity. The Court affirmed the decisions below, holding that "the
overwhelming weight of authority" required possession.? However, it did
not rest solely on this orthodox ground. Chief Justice Stone repeated his pre-
vious statements about judicial freedom to determine immunity in the absence
of "recognition and allowance.M72 But he added a significant qualification-
the exercise of this freedom must be in accord with executive policy.53 The
"controlling" consideration in Hoffman, he declared, was that the State De-
partment had not granted this claim, nor had it ever advocated immunity for
vessels owned but not possessed by foreign governments.5M The Chief Justice
said that "[i]t is therefore not for the courts . . . to allow an immunity on
new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.", For this
would embarrass the political department in its efforts to secure the national
interest, just as would denying immunity contrary to executive policy?0
On its face Hoffman would seem to advocate a somewhat inconsistent
approach. Requiring courts to look to past executive policy in the absence of
48. The State Department's first "suggestion" merely stated that the Department was
transmitting the Mexican Government's claim "as a matter of comity between the United
States Government and the Government of Mexico for such consideration as this Court
may deem necessary and proper." Mexico v. Hoffman, 143 F2d 854, 855 (9th Cir. 1944).
The second communication said that the Department accepted as true the assertion that
the Mexican Government owned the libelled vessel. Mfexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 32
(1945).
49. The district court's conclusions are set forth in the opinion on appeal. fedco v.
Hoffman, 143 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1944).
50. Ibid.
51. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945).
52. In The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938), the then Justice Stone said: "The Depart-
ment of State having declined to act, the want of admiralty jurisdiction because of the
alleged public status of the vessel and the right of the Spanish Government to demand
possession of the vessel as owner if it so elected, were appropriate subjects for judicial
inquiry upon proof of the matters alleged." Id. at 75.
In Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), Chief Justice Stone said: "the district court,
in the absence of recognition of the immunity by the Department of State, had authority
to decide for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity existed-whether the ves-
sel when seized was petitioner's, and was of a character entitling it to the immunity."
Id. at 587-8.
In 'Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), he repeated his Peru statement almost
verbatim, but he added to the words "entitling it to the immunity" a new phrasc--"in con-
formity to the principles accepted by the department of the government charged with the
conduct of our foreign relations." Id. at 35.
53. See the quotation from 'Mexico v. Hoffman, supra note 52.
54. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945).
55. Id. at 35.
56. Id. at 35-6.
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"recognition and allowance" would ignore the importance of executive failure
to approve the claim in the case at bar: If the State Department has favored
immunity in similar situations and has declined to do so in this case, its dis-
approval of the instant claim could not be more clear.57 It would seem foolish
for the courts to disregard present policy in favor of past policy.
Lower court decisions since Hoffman have avoided this inconsistency by
refusing to acknowledge Hoffman as going beyond Perit.8 In the absence of
"recognition and allowance," they have decided the immunity issue according
to traditional principles without attributing significance either to present ex-
ecutive inaction or to past executive policyYr0 But such a view ignores the
Court's emphasis upon the absence of State Department approval. Even com-
mentators who strongly disagree with the idea of political determination of
immunity 60 share the view that ". . . one reading the opinion of Chief Justice
Stone in the Hoffman case might well assume that this is a subject with
regard to which no body of law exists, a subject governed entirely by political
considerations.
'61
57. The Hoffman opinion contemplates contacting the State Department in all cases.
Where the foreign state presents its claim of immunity by appearing in court without re-
questing State Department aid, "the court will inquire whether the ground of immunity is
one which it is the established policy of the department to recognize." Id. at 36.
58. Upon executive "recognition and allowance," lower courts have generally granted
immunity without further inquiry. See, e.g., Lorina v. The Rossia, (Civil No. 18767,
E.D.N.Y., April 6, 1948) (complaint dismissed without opinion); Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Netherlands East Indies Government, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). And executive
approval of immunity has been held binding in cases where immunity would not have beet]
granted under traditional doctrine. See, e.g., Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d
577 (1944), reaff'd, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64 (1945) (government corporation) ; Stone
Engineering Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945) (same). Occasion-
ally, a maverick court refuses to be bound, at least verbally, by "recognition and allow-
ance." But in such cases immunity has been granted on traditional grounds. See, e.g.,
Frazer v. Hanover Bank, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1953).
59. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952); Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944), reaff'd, 294 N.Y. 265,
62 N.E.2d 64 (1945) (court held that it was free to decide all questions which the State
Department had not "recognized and allowed") ; Koster v. Banco Minero de Bolivia, 129
N.Y.L.J. 1590, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. May 12, 1953). But see The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp.
211 (N.D. Wash. 1946), where the district judge made executive refusal to approve im-
munity for a Canadian ship an alternative ground for denying immunity, citing Mexico
v. Hoffman.
60. E.g., BRIGGs, LAW OF NATIoNs 450 (2d ed. 1952) ; Defik, The Plea of Sovcreign
Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals, 40 COL. L. REV. 453, 460-1. (1940) ; Jessup,
Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
These writers maintain that immunity is a question for the courts to decide according to
international law. The State Department, if it intervenes at all, should simply transmit the
foreign government's claim of immunity and certify that government as a recognized sov-
ereign.
61. Jessup, supra note 60, at 168. See BRIGGS, LAW OF NATIONS 450 (2d ed. 1952).
Cf. DeAk, supra note 60, at 460.
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A third interpretation makes Hoffman stand for the obverse of the "recog-
nition and allowance" doctrine. It has been suggested that courts night be
required to assume jurisdiction over the merits in each case in which the ee-
cutive fails to "recognize and allow" immunity. 2 This view looks to the con-
curring opinion of Justice Frankfurter for aid in interpreting the ambiguous
statement of the majority. This concurrence, in which Justice Black joined,
stated that courts should not surrender jurisdiction unless the State Depart-
ment or Congress explicitly asserts the necessity of abstention.03 Such an in-
terpretation seems more consistent with the majority position than do lower
court opinions. And it provides a rational method for executive-judicial co-
operation with respect to an essentially "political" question."r
Because both the first and third interpretations of Hoffman would permit
the executive to impose its views on the courts in all sovereign immunity
cases, opponents of the absolute theory find hope in this decision.Gs For the
State Department has not shared the judiciary's determined adherence to the
absolute theory. 6
62. Cardozo, Sovereign Immnzity: The Plaintiff Deserz'es A Day if Court, 67 HAnV.
L. REv. 608, 616 (1954).
This seems to be the State Department's interpretation of Hoff man. See 26 Dr-PVr
STATE BuuL. 984, 985 (1952), v-here its Acting Legal Advisor said in thinly veiled terms:
"It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts Lut it is
felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity wlhere the execu-
tive has declined to do so."
63. Me-dco v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 41-2 (1945).
64. Professor Cardozo is one of the few who recognizes that granting immunity is a
"political" task. "Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity as a sotyerign depends on
the resolution of two issues: (1) is it considered a sovereign government? and (2) will
the interests of foreign relations be furthered by relieving it from responding in court?
Although the ultimate decision will probably be looked upon as a precedent in the field
called 'international law,' neither of these issues is a question of law to be left to the courts
for decision. The first depends on the 'status' of the defendant, always recognized as a
question for the political branch to decide. The second can be answered only by the agency
charged with the conduct of foreign relations.... ." Cardozo, snfra note 62, at 614-15.
65. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, 28 BriT. Y.B. IxNx. L. 220, 268-70 (1951) ; Cardozo, sutra
note 62.
66. The State Department advocated abandonment of the absolute theory as early as
1918 when it took the view that government vessels engaged in commerce should not re-
ceive immunity. 2 HACKwORTH, DIGEsT or IN-ERmvrboAu Law 429 (1941). And in
1927 when the Attorney-General brought an antitrust suit against the Deutsches Kalisvn-
dikat Gesellshaft, an "organization created and controlled by the French Republic," the
Department stated that "it has long been the view of the Department of State that agencies
of foreign governments engaged in ordinary commercial transactions in the United States
enjoy no privileges or immunities not appertaining to other foreign corptrations, agencie;,
and individuals doing business here, and should conform to the laws of this country
governing such transactions." 2 Id. at 481. But judicial refusal to heed its views in many
cases caused the Department to return to the absolute theory. For an account of execu-
tive efforts to curb immunity, see 2 id. at 426 ct seq. And for the Department's most re-
cent stand, see note 67 infra and accompanying text.
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The Restrictive Theory
In May, 1952, the State Department announced its adoption of the "restric-
tive theory. '67 This rule attempts to distinguish between public or sovereign
and private or commercial activities of a foreign state and denies immunity
to the latter.6 8
The restrictive theory, however, is another inadequate means of coping with
the problem of foreign sovereign immunity. Like previous attempts to confine
the absolute theory, it is based on an unrealistic distinction-in this case that
the sovereign is not sovereign when it participates in private pursuits. This
is unacceptable in theory because the state always acts for the general pur-
poses of the community. It cannot act for private purposes. 0 The Supreme
Court made this the basis for its decision in The Pesaro,70 where it granted
immunity to a merchant vessel owned and possessed by a foreign state.71 Also,
Congress has recognized no distinction between public and private acts with
respect to the liability of the United States.72
67. 26 DiP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). This policy announcement took the form of a
letter from the Acting Legal Advisor of the State Department to the Attorney-General.
As indicated in the Department's statement, many European and several other countries
apply the restrictive theory, while the United States, Great Britain and the Common-
wealth, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and Poland apply "the classical or virtually absolute
theory of sovereign immunity." Apparently, the law in other nations is in a state of flux.
Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Professor Lauterpacht writes "it is no longer generally accepted that the economic
activities of the state-such as state management of industry, state buying, and state sell-
ing-are necessarily of a purely 'private-law nature'; that they are lure gestionis; and that
in engaging in them a state acts like a private person. In these and similar cases ostensi-
bly removed from the normal field of its political and administrative activities, the state
nevertheless acts as a public person for the general purposes of the community as a whole.
This applies not only to states with a socialist economy where trading or management of
industry have become a public function of the state. For the state always acts as a public
person. It cannot act otherwise. In a real sense all acts jure geslionis are acts jure i-t.
peri." LAUTERPACHT, supra note 65, at 224. See also FENWicK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 308
(3d ed. 1948) ; Fairman, Sonte Disputed Applications of the Principle of State Immunity,
22 Am. J. INT'L L. 566, 569 et seq. (1928).
70. 271 U.S. 562 (1.926).
71. The Court, speaking through Justice Van Devanter, said that "when, for the pur-
pose of advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a govern-
ment acquires, mans and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the
same sense that war ships are. We know of no international usage which regards the
maintenance and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace as any
less a public purpose than the maintenance and training of a naval force." The Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562, 574 (1926). Professor Lauterpacht states that this is "a view which, probably, is
not far removed from reality. .. ." LAuTErPAcET , supra note 65, at 224. For a conclusion
similar to that of the Supreme Court, see De Howorth v. S.S. India, [1921] So. Af. L. Rep.
[C.P.D. III] 451.
72. The Tucker Act permits the United States to be sued in the Court of Claims upon
"[A]II claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress
... or upon any contract . . . or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not
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And in practice it is very difficult to draw the line between sovereign and
commercial endeavors.7" It is generally stated that a sovereign activity is one
in which only the government may engage, while a commercial activity is one
open to private persons.74 However, in some states private persons may pur-
sue all but a few activities, while in others the economic sphere in which
ordinary citizens may participate is severely limited.75 Should the public-pri-
vate distinction be based upon the economic structure of the United States
or upon that of the defendant state ?7o Should the situs of the alleged harm
sounding in tort... ." And it grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal district cuurts in
cases involving not more than $10,000. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(20), 250(1)
(1946). The Federal Tort Claims Act permits federal district courts to hear "any claim
against the United States, for money only ... on account of damage to or loss of prort2rty
or on account of personal injury or death . . .caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury or death in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred." (0 STAT. 843, 2S U.S.C. § 931 (a)
(1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952). (This, of course,
does not permit suits against the United States for such acts as fraud, deceit, or malicious
prosecution by its employees.) The Public Vessels Act provides: "A libel in persnam fit
admiralty may be brought against the United States ... for damages caused by a public
vessel of the United States .. " 43 STA'T. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §781 (1940). This
statute was passed to complement the Suits in Admiralty Act, which pr&6ided for suits
against United States merchant vessels. 41 ST.T. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1946).
73. Outside of the traditional sphere of military and diplomatic activities, there is little
international agreement upon what constitutes a "sovereign," as distinguished from a "non-
sovereign," activity. See cases cited in the -LmvanD REsmuzcu, 20 Am. J. I:T*L L 451,
609 et seq. (Supp. 1932) ; Bishop, Ne, United States Poli3y Limiting Stvcrcign n-
munity, 47 Am. J. IxITL L. 93, 103 (1953). All commentators, includirg those who advo-
cate the restrictive theory, admit that this is a task of exceptional difficulty. See, e.g., id.
at 105; Cardozo, Sozrcign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves 1 Day it Colrt, 67 Hnv.
L. REv. 608 (1954) ; Fensterwald, Szvercin nmmitify and Soviet State Trading, ('3 Rva..
L. REv. 614, 624 (1950).
Even agreement within a single nation may be difficult to achieve. See In re Investi-
gation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 2 0 (D.D.C. 1952), one of the few reported
United States decisions since announcement of the restrictive theory. Despite State De-
partment refusal to "recognize and allow" the claim to immunity of the Angli-Iranian Oil
Co., the district court granted immunity. It found that supplying oil to the Royal Navy
and Air Force "is certainly a fundamental government function serving a public purjse."
Id. at 290. United States courts have found it difficult to draw the line between "govern-
mental" and "proprietary" functions of municipal corporaticns. See 6 .MLQviLL'.-:, .117-
NIciPAL. CoraOTIoxs §§ 2798, 2850 (2d ed. 1928). See also New Yurl: v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946).
74. See Fensterwvald, supra note 73, at 617; Fitzmaurice, State Inm;:u:ity Froa Pro-
ceedings in Foreign Courts, 14 BRiT. Y.B. IxTL L. 123 (1933).
75. See Bishop, supra note 73, at 103.
76. It would seem expedient to base the public-private distinction upon the economic
structure of the defendant state in order to minimize the possibilities of friction with that
state. But then application of the restrictive theory in American courts might fail to re-
duce significantly the number of instances in which immunity would e granted. For pri-
-ate persons play a lesser role in the economies of most states than they do in the United
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be determinative as in private international law ?77 Moreover, whichever nation
is looked to, the further problem arises of determining whether the transactions
should be classified according to their nature or their purpose.78 The "nature"
test would categorize all purchases of goods as "commercial," because private
persons can purchase goods.79 On the other hand, the "purpose" test would
grant immunity if the government bought army supplies, but probably not if
it bought tobacco for public resale.80 No satisfactory criteria have been de-
vised for dealing with the many subtleties of this doctrine.81
Furthermore, the restrictive theory cannot be a functional doctrine, in. the
sense of promoting the policy underlying immunity. Adherence to any "legal
principle" prevents close correlation between the immunity granted and the
policy of avoiding international friction. It is difficult to determine in advance
the cases in which immunity will be important to relations with a foreign
state.
8 2
States. These states would therefore have a broader definition of what constitutes a sov-
ereign activity. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 74, at 123.
77. For an evaluation of the territorial principle in private international law, see
Niboyet, Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of Laws, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 582 (1952).
78. The Department of State's announcement adopting the restrictive theory gave no
indication of the criteria to be used in distinguishing "public" from "private" state activ-
ities. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
79. See LAUTERPACHT, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 225 (1951), for discussion of the
"nature" test as developed in VEIss, COMPE£TENCE OU L'INCOMPIi"TENcE DES TRIDUNAUN
A L GARD DES ATATS LTRANGERS (Hague Academy of Int'l Law, 1923) ; Bishop, supra
note 73, at 105.
80. See Fensterwald, supra note 73, at 621.
81. After reviewing judicial efforts to apply the restrictive theory in various states,
Professor Lauterpacht expresses doubts "whether the uncertainty produced by their de-
cisions, the inconsistencies, and the resulting absence of an ascertainable standard capable
of general application ought to be perpetuated." LAUTERIACHT, supra note 79, at 225. He
points out that the French have abandoned the public-private distinction for the purpose of
delimiting the competence of judicial and executive tribunals. Id. at 224. Compare this
conclusion with Professor Bishop's optimism in discussing the State Department's adoption
of the restrictive theory: "In dealing with the harder cases, it may be hoped that our
courts, lawyers and government officials will pay close heed to the decisions and the rea-
soning of the courts in other countries which have been drawing this distinction for many
years and which will continue to have occasion to do so. On the basis of such a compara-
tive approach, and taking into account the internal-law distinctions which our own courts
have drawn in the fields of municipal corporations' liabilities to suit and inter-govern-
mental immunities from taxes, we may expect the new practice to work out more satis-
factorily than could any present attempt to give it precision in words." Bishop, snupra note
73, at 106.
82. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952), discussed in notes 33 and 73 supra. In that case immunity would have been denied
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. under both the restrictive and the absolute theories. And the
State Department did not "recognize and allow" the British Government's claim to im-
munity. Yet the district judge, apparently less bound by rules than the State Department,
stressed immunity's importance to Great Britain in this instance and granted its request.
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Executive adherence to the restrictive theory overlooks the opportunity
presented by the third interpretation of Hoftian. If judicial principles are to
govern, there is little justification for removing the task of applying them from
the courts.8 3 But the significance of the executive determination made possible
by Hoffman is that it would permit case by case policy decisions on questions
of immunity. Under this flexible approach, the executive would grant im-
munity whenever the exercise of judicial authority in the particular situation
threatened to prejudice foreign relations. And immunity would be denied in
all other instances.
84
THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEM oF THE INJURED PAnTY
Yet executive predominance, whether used to apply a policy approach or
the restrictive theory, fails to provide adequately for the injured party. Exec-
utive determination of judicial jurisdiction leaves plaintiff more helpless than
lever. It makes possible an adverse decision on the question of immunity with-
out assuring him of the hearing provided by prior practice.8 5 Upon "recog-
nition and allowance," courts dismiss plaintiff's suit.86 Such an administrative
determination without notice and hearing seems inconsistent with the spirit
of due process.
8 7
And even if procedures were established for a hearing before the State De-
partment,8s this would not aid the plaintiff in cases where immunity is granted.
83. One commentator has attempted to justify executive determination k. stating
that: "So long as the Exnecutive ... acts by reference not to shifting motives of p'Aicy but
to considerations of legal principle, there is ro,m for the view that questions of immunity
are a technical legal matter of some complexity; that the relevant Department of the Ex-
ecutive which, with the help of an expert staff fully trained in this btranch of the law,
addresses the Court on this subject is particularly well-equipptil for ar-swering the ques-
tions involved in accordance with international law: and that unless there is an assurance
that courts will show sufficient familiarity with the rules cf internati nal law on the sub-
ject ... there is no reason to view the existing practice with undue apprehensin." Lyons,
The Conclusiveness of the 'Snggeslion' and Certificate of the l~mericau Slate DeParln:cnt,
24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 116, 146-7 (1947).
84. This would avoid the absurd results reached in the cases cited note 37 sitfra.
85. Procedure under the doctrine of "recofgition and alluwance" laid down in The
Naz'emar is in sharp contrast to the traditional court trial on the issue of immunity. The
State Department may grant immunity before the plaintiff has any idea that it has been
requested. Cardozo, Sovereign Innnunity: The Plainrtiff Desen',s A Lhy in L urt, 67
I-Lt. L. REv. 608, 613 (1954).
86. See, e.g., Ex Porte Peru, 318 U.S. .78 (1943); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands
East Indies Government, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Piascik v. British Ministry of
War Transport, 54 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
87. Some commentators have even raised the question of the cvnstitutiomiality uf such
a proceeding. E.g., Cardozo, supra note 85, at 613; Kuhn, The Extension of SuvcrCin
Imnnity to Goz'eniment-Ozned Commercial Corp rations, 39 Am. J. I:;T*L L 772, 775
(1945) ; Lyons, supra note 83, at 141.
8S. It has been suggested that the requirements of due prt cess would Ne mit 1,. all.w-
ing plaintiff either oral or written argument before the State Delartmont. Cardtoz, mpra
note 85, at 617. If the Department acts on a case to case basis, geared tv the demands cf
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The day in court which plaintiff deserves is not one for a sterile struggle over
his right to sue. He is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim.8 9 From
plaintiff's viewpoint, it makes no difference whether this opportunity for relief
is denied by the courts or by the executive. Nor is it consolation that the
decision is made according to a policy approach or the restrictive theory rather
than the absolute theory.90 The vice of immunity is always the same-it is the
permanent refusal to hear an injured party's complaint when it is doubtful
that he will be otherwise compensated. 01
The injustice of allowing immunity is particularly apparent in tort cases. A
private party who makes a contract with a foreign government enters into the
transaction voluntarily. Although his bargaining position may not be equal to
that of the contracting government, nevertheless he can often protect himself
against breach by obtaining security. Or the terms of the bargain may reflect
the element of risk, as in a foreign bond investment. But the situation is
generally quite different with respect to one whose person or property is
tortiously damaged by a foreign sovereign. He seldom incurs the risk of in-
jury voluntarily, and when he does, he usually cannot protect himself ade-
quately.
Many foreign states recognize their liability before their own courts.02 And
United States courts may entertain suits against the federal government in
both contract and tort.93 But no corresponding reform of international law
has taken place.94 Assuring redress to persons wronged by a foreign sover-
international relations, such a hearing would be of little value to the plaintiff. For the
determination of immunity would then be a matter peculiarly within the Department's
competence. And it is doubtful that plaintiff's argument would influence its conclusion,
On the other hand, if the Department bases its decision on the restrictive theory or any
other legal formula, a hearing would be important to plaintiff. But the suggested hearing
would provide plaintiff with a less adequate opportunity to present his case than did the
trial which he formerly enjoyed on the issue of immunity.
89. Some writers often appear less interested in increasing the number of cases in which
courts may hear the merits than in preserving judicial power to determine the jurisdic-
tional question. See the authorities cited note 60 supra.
90. Cf. Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1950), where the
court noted that a distinction such as that between "public" and "merchant" vessels was
"insignificant to the merits of the seaman's claim."
91. The injured party's alternative prospects for recovery against an unwilling sov-
ereign defendant are indeed dim. Diplomatic adjustment of his claim is slow and uncer-
tain. And suit against the foreign governrhent in its own courts, if permitted, "would
probably necessitate expenses incommensurate with the prospective recovery." Fenster-
wald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARv. L. REV. 614, 622-3 (1950).
See also The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
92. For brief discussion of the extent to which the leading trading states allow them-
selves to be sued at home, see LAUTERPACHT, 28 BaT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 234-5 (1951);
Sanborn, The Immunity of Merchant Vessels When Owned By Forcign Governnments, I
ST. JoiN's L. Rlv. 5, 17-18 (1926).
93. See note 72 supra.
94. Professor Lauterpacht has stated that: "there are but few subjects in which eco-
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eign without jeopardizing relations with that sovereign is a problem that re-
mains to be solved.
A PROPOSED APPROACH
For acts within United States territory, a foreign government should enjoy
no greater freedom from suit in United States courts "7' than does the federal
government.-G If a foreign state chooses to act within the United States, it
seems not unfair to require it to abide by American policy as embodied in
various statutes restricting immunity0 7 Under this approach, liability for a
British warship's tortious conduct in American waters would be determined
by the Public Vessels Act.- And where an agency of the Turlish Govern-
ment breaches a contract made in the United States, it would he liable to suit
nomic and social factors and the general prog-ression tomwrds the rule of law within the
state provide a more compelling opportunity for a r e.xaminatiFn and eventual remu'.al of
what is widely and increasingly considered t, be an antmaly." L.WT. 1A.: ur. supra note
92, at 249. See also Justice Frankfurter's suagcdion that tie d.trine of s,,vtrJ n im-
munity be reappraised. fe.ico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 20, 40-1 1945) tc ,ncurring opiri,,n .
95. The approach suggested b. this commini-t purrorts t-.4 apply onaly in the fidral
courts. Because foreign sovereign immunity is a subject --4 pculiarly nati,,nal concern, it
is probable that national policy is controlling in state ckurts alzo. See Nute, 45 Co,. L.
REv. S0, 84 n.19 (1945). Certainly, state courts have generally followed the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the doctrine of soirei-n immunity. See, c.q., .Mexic v.
Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944), rcalTd, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E2d (A (1945) :
Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945). De:,
The Plea of Soz'ercign Immuity and the .XV, Ytorh Court of Appeals, 40 CoL. L. RLv.
453, (1940). Yet, to avoid added complication and unnecessary objection, it appears wise
to limit the proffered program to the federal courts. This would n,,t detract from its
efficacy. For plaintiffs, in order to gain the advantages of the reform, would alma.s sue
in the federal courts, provided that cther jurisdicti-Lnal requirements could J. met.
96. This limitation upon foreign sovereign imirun'ity would repr:Etnt no startling
innovation. One of the early American dedsiviks grauting immunity %%as based up ,n the
idea of assimilating the foreign state to the domestic state. Long v. The Tampic.', 16 Fed.
491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). And a recLnt case reemphasizcd this idea. "In the absence of
statute or treaty, no sound principle of law or of international comity requires that the
courts of this country treat a foreign governmen~t more favorably as to st,vcreign immunity
than our own Government is treated by the courts." The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211,
212 (W.D. Wash. 1946). See also LAVTF.nPC HT, snpra note 92, at 22o.
97. On the contrary, the unfairness lies in allowing thv frcign state to remain alve
the local law while the domestic state and all its citizens are subject to that law.. ThiL
principle was recognized in Article 11 (i the HArv'xR R rrAncii, 2o Ani. J. I:;-'. L. 451
(Supp. 1932), which proposed that: "A State may be made a respondent in a prceeding
in a court of another State when, in the territory of such other State, it engage3 in an
industrial, commercial, financial or other business enterprise in which private rcrz ,ns my
there engage. . . ." Id. at 597. Reform based on the assimilation of the firci-n State toj
the local state seems in the offing. "Public opinion and practical considcratiuns d not
permit too wide a gap between the law governing the immunities of the hme state and
the law, which many regard as increasingly artificial, unjust, and arc:bnc, rating tn. th,
immunities of foreign states." LAVTErr.cT, s pra rote 92, at 221.
98. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (194t,), quoted note 72 sutra.
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upon that contract because the Tucker Act grants a remedy against the federal
government. 99
For acts outside the United States, a foreign state should receive no greater
privilege in American courts than it reserves for itself at home.1°° If the act
occurs within the defendant state, its interest in affairs within its own terri-
tory would seem to demand that its view of domestic sovereign immunity
govern.101 Plaintiff would have no cause to complain. Having gone abroad,
he cannot expect his rights to be determined according to American views.
If the act occurs within a third state, that state could conceivably provide the
standard for determining immunity. 0 2 But its interest in this dispute would
99. See note 72 supra. This illustrates one of the minor modifications that may have
to be made in assimilating the foreign state to the United States with respect to acts done
by the former within our borders. The various statutes restricting the immunity of the
United States before its own courts may contain provisions which would be inconsistent
with full application of the suggested reform. For instance, the Tucker Act places an
upper limit of $10,000 on the recovery that may be had against the United States in federal
district courts, while no such limit exists for suits in the Court of Claims, See note 72
supra. In order to provide adequate relief it would seem sensible not to apply this upper
limit in destrict court cases involving contract claims against a foreign sovereign, unless
the Court of Claims were to be made available to the plaintiff. The statute implementing
the proposed reform could incorporate all such necessary modifications. See text at note
132 infra.
In cases where process cannot be served upon a foreign state through ordinary means,
plaintiff should be permitted to serve the diplomatic representative of that state. See
Article 19 of the HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 97, at 676, which suggests an analogous
result via a more circuitous procedure.
100. See Sanborn, supra note 92, at 15-16. Cf. Mann, Sacrosanctity of Foreign Acts
of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42, 157 (1943). Many proposals for reform apply only to a for-
eign state's acts within the forum. E.g., Article 11 of the HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note
97, at 597. However, it is interesting to note that the State Department letter adopting the
restrictive theory did not contain any such limitation. Bishop, New United States Policy
Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 93, 106 n.41 (1953). Indeed, a proposal
that did not curtail immunity for acts done ohtside the forum would fail to deal with many
important situations.
Under this suggested approach, one injured by a French mail truck would gain access
to American courts if France permits itself to be sued upon such a claim. And where a
merchant ship operated by the Italian Government fails to deliver goods to their American
purchaser, according to a contract made in Italy, it would be liable in American courts
if liable in Italy.
But if the tribunal in which the foreign state grants a remedy is an administrative
board or other body substantially different from our courts, the United States would de-
cline jurisdiction, applying a doctrine similar to that of forum non; conveniens in private
international law.
101. Just as the territorial principle tips the balance in favor of adopting United
States policy toward its own immunity as the standard for the immunity of a foreign
government acting within the United States, here it favors adoption of the policy of the
defendant state. See note 97 supra. The latter state, as both defendant and the situs of the
event, would seem the more intimately concerned.
102. The les loci actius is a solution widely followed in private international law cases.
See Niboyet, Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rides of Conflict of Laws, 65
HARv. L. REv. 582 (1952).
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not merit preference over the views of either the defendant state or the
forum.' 0 3 Here the standard of the defendant state should again prevail. Be-
cause the proposed over-all limitation of immunity would deprive the defendant
state of its presently privileged position, it would seem expedient to ease its
adoption in this instance 1w by allowing the defendant state's conception of
sovereign immunity to govern in United States courts.
In order to foster foreign friendship, flexible procedures may be necessary
where this approach would deny immunity. These procedures would deal with
the occasional cases where matters closely allied with sovereign prestige or
security may be the subject of litigation. 0 5 Whenever the State Department
is persuaded that such a case is before the courts, it should request a continu-
ance.' 16 And postponement for a reasonable time should then be mandatory.
This wiill allow a foreign state that can foresee liability an opportunity to save
face by disposing of its dispute through arbitration, diplomatic negotiation or
other means of settlement. 0 7 If plaintiff's claim remains unsatisfied at the ex-
piration of the period, he should be able to proceed with his case unless the
State Department can show cause for further postponement. Where settle-
ment does not result from another continuance, the court should ordinarily
hear the merits.
But the State Department should still be able to prevent the exercise of
jurisdiction where it would prejudice the national interest. In the rare tort
cases where this might be necessary,OSs upon State Department certification
the United States should be added as defendant.'0° The Department should
103. Here the territorial state is not one of the parties to the jurisdictional dispute;
it is therefore less directly concerned with the question of immunity than either the de-
fendant or the local state. However, if the decision on this preliminary, "public inter-
national law" question is against the defendant state, then the defendant is treated like a
private person. In such a case, the principles of private internatio;nal la., govern, as in
any other case involving foreign facts.
104. Where the defendant state's act takes place in the United States, international
expediency should yield to American policy toward sovereign immunity. See note 97
stpra and accompanying text.
105. For instance, at least temporary immunity may be extremely important to a
government that cannot meet pa-ments to American bondholders. Or a decision affecting
foreign exchange controls may threaten international relatins. See Sullivan v. Sao Paulo,
122 F2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941), discussed in note 36 supra.
106. The same procedure which the Department employs for other c-mmunicati~ns
with the courts would serve here. See note 41 szrpra.
107. For e.xample, this breathing spell would provide an opprtunit:y for the finan-
cially embarrassed state to work out a plan satisfactory to creditors.
10S. It is doubtful that foreign governments would press very vig,r; usly to obtain
immunity in most tort cases. Comparcd to the amounts involved in contract cases, the
damages for injury to plaintiff's person or property would generally be small. And the
injustice of denying plaintiff a remedy is apparmnL See p. 1104 sutre. For the prAab.le
consequences to international relations (, the sufgt. twd limitati,,n of immunity, fte ?L::t
at notes 117-129 inffra.
109. This, of course, would require Congressional legislation. See text at note 1.30
infra.
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then "recognize and allow" the foreign government's claim to immunity, and
plaintiff should litigate his claim against the United States. If he wins his
case, he should satisfy his judgment against the United States. It alone can
distribute the loss among all who benefit from this protection of the national
interest. Furthermore, it can better bear the burden of awaiting reimburse-
ment through diplomatic channels than can plaintiff. In contract cases where
foreign relations will be injured by the exercise of jurisdiction, the State De-
partment should simply "recognize and allow" immunity. Plaintiff should not
recover from the United States in such cases. Having voluntarily undertaken
the risk of dealing with a foreign sovereign, often in order to obtain great
profits, he cannot expect other taxpayers to become insurers for his losses. 110
Similarly flexible treatment of the problem of execution against foreign sov-
ereign property would assure relief to the successful plaintiff without sacrific-
ing international harmony."' When the foreign state posts bond to obtain re-
lease of its property, as is often done in an in rent proceeding, judgment can
be satisfied out of the bond. 11 2 And it seems probable that in most other cases
a sovereign will honor a judgment, either because of a desire for reciprocal
treatment for its nationals or because of respect for public opinion. 113 How-
ever, if defendant fails to satisfy judgment within a reasonable time, plaintiff
should request a court order levying upon any sovereign property within the
jurisdiction, 1 14 with the exception of diplomatic, military, and similar prop-
110. Of course, the dividing line between the traditional categories of tort and contract
is far from precise in the variety of situations possible in an international context. It may
be that in some "contract" situations the plaintiff's participation is sufficiently involuntary,
his bargaining position sufficiently weak, and his profit prospect sufficiently limited to
justify treating him as a tort victim.
111. Because of judicial adherence to the absolute theory of jurisdictional immunity
in the United States, there have been few occasions for considering the problem of exe-
cution against foreign sovereign property. In the only case of note, the Second Circuit
held that execution could not issue against sovereign property even where the sovereign
had consented to the suit in which the judgment against him was rendered. Dexter & Car-
penter v. Kunglig, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931). Al-
though many writers and foreign courts agree with this decision, it is not certain that
immunity from execution is a generally acknowledged principle of international law.
LAUTERPACdT, 28 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 222 (1951). And sentiment against such im-
munity has been increasing. See, e.g., Fensterwald, Sovcreign vnsmunity and Soviet State
Trading, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 614, 626 (1950) ; LAUTERPACHT, supra at 222.
112. This appears to be usual in admiralty proceedings. See, e.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 580 (1943), where Justice Frankfurter points out in his dissent that "the actual
stake of the controversy is a bond." Id. at 601.
Article 24 of the HARVARD RESEARCH, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 451, 714 (Supp. 1932), would
extend this practice to all sovereign immunity cases at the option of the defendant. This
would avoid friction that might arise from execution against sovereign property, and it
would also guarantee satisfaction to the plaintiff.
113. A few years after the decision in Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig, 43 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931), discussed note 111 supra, the Swedish
Government paid $150,000 in settlement of the judgment against it for $411,203.72.
114. Requiring plaintiff to wait a reasonable time after judgment and then to go to
court to obtain an order of execution represents a departure from federal practice, A
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erty."0  And in the absence of executive objection, the court should enforce
the judgment. But the State Department should be able to prevent execution
if it would be harmful to the national interest. The United States should then
indemnify plaintiff for the amount that he would otherwise have recovered,
instead of requiring him to subsidize the maintenance of international amity. 11
Effect on Forcign Relations
Having provided for cases where immunity from the jurisdiction or from
execution may be vital, no other considerations should detract from the pro-
posed reform. Sovereign immunity is not an immutable principle of inter-
national law.117 The only doctrinal limitation upon the right of the local state
to subject sovereign instrumentalities to its tribunals is that it give unambigu-
ous notice of its intention to pursue such a policy in the future.113 The only
practical limitation is the possibility of retaliation.iO But it is unlihely that
this retaliation would amount to more than reciprocal treatment of the United
States in foreign courts.1-"0
Judicial fear of offending sovereign dignity seems greatly exaggerated.12'
Indeed, dignity would appear to require the modem democratic state to refrain
successful plaintiff may usually take out execution upon registering his judgment. The
suggested innovation would prevent diplomatic difficulties that might otherwise arise from
a levy upon sovereign property. For the court would always contact the State Department
before acting upon the request for execution. See Article 25 of the HA' , RcscF1n ,
supra note 112, at 715-16.
115. For views approving of execution subject to these exiceptions, see Fenstervald,
supra note 111, at 626; LAUER,.PC'T, supra note 111, at 243. The HAnv.%rn Rvsrc.cu,
supra note 112, at 706, would allow ececution against immt,vable propVerty not used for
diplomatic purposes and against property used in business enterprises.
116. See LAUTFRPACHT, supra note 111, at 243. For purposes of strengthening its
legal position in subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the defendant state, the United
States might obtain an assignment of the judgment claim against that state.
117. For detailed support for this unorthodox conclusion, see LwtmrncAr, supra
note 111, at 226 et seq.
118. See The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 146 (U.S. 1812), discussed in the text at note
5 szupra; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 28,3, 352-3 (U.S. 1822).
119. See Dek, The Plea of Sovereign Innunity and the New Yorh Court of Appeals,
40 CoL L. REv. 453, 464 (1940). It is this prospect of retaliation that provides the real
sanction of international law.
120. When a state believes that action taken against it by another state contravenes
accepted usages and when it decides to retaliate, such retaliation is generally in kind. See,
e.g., 22 DEP'T STA E BuLL. 921 (1950) (the United States retaliated against restrictions
imposed upon its official personnel by the Rumanian Government by imposing similar re-
strictions upon Rumanian -personnel in this country). And the importance of the United
States in the world power process would seem to preclude foreign states from going be-
yond the bounds of reciprocal treatment. See Note, 58 YAm L.J. 176, 10 (1943).
Such reciprocal treatment for the United States abroad is precisely what is cnvimed
by the suggested reform. See note 133 infra and accompanying tet
121. The decline of personal sovereignty in the mcdern world has made concern over
sovereign dignity unrealistic. This has deprived foreign sovereign immunity of its usual
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from hiding behind its medieval shield . 2- Adoption of the restrictive theory by
many foreign courts,'2 3 with occasional exercise of authority over acts of con-
siderable public importance, 124 has given rise to little protest.12 6 And Ameri-
can diplomatic relations suffered no adverse effects when, despite vigorous
claims of immunity, United States courts excepted corporations of foreign
governments from the absolute theory.1
2 6
Furthermore, from a long-term perspective, judicial remedies against for-
eign states may enhance, rather than impede, international friendship. 2 7 Satis-
faction of many otherwise frustrated claims would produce a favorable im-
pact upon American opinion of other nations. And the envisaged reciprocal
treatment of our government in foreign courts 128 would yield a similarly
beneficial result in terms of foreign opinion of the United States. This ex-
tended competence of national courts would also relieve diplomacy of the
burden of attempting to settle many cases which the judiciary can handle more
economically and more justly.
129
justification. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Most writers have reached this
conclusion. See, e.g., Fensterwald, supra note 111, at 623; Sanborn, The In nilty of
Government-Owned Merchant Vessels, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 794, 795 (1945).
122. See the opinion of Maugham, L.J., in The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 521. And
several centuries ago Baron Atkyns stated that: "the party ought in this case to be re-
lieved against the King, because the King is the fountain and head of justice and equity;
and it shall not be presumed, that he will be defective in either. And it would derogate
from the King's honour to imagine, that what is equity against a common person, should
not be equity against him. . . ." Pawlett v. Attorney-General, (1668] Hard. 465, 469. And
for the view that it would be inconsistent with the dignity of the local sovereign not to be
able to exercise authority over a foreign governmental instrumentality operating within it4
borders, see Molina v. Comision Reguladora, 91 N.J.L. 382, 390, 103 Atl. 397, 400 (Sup,
Ct. 1918).
123. See note 67 supra.
124. See cases cited in LAUTERPACHT, 28 Bar. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 250 el seq. (1951).
125. See LAUTIERPACHT, supra note 124, at 227. No serious diplomatic complications
have arisen from exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign state, and the ancient fear of a
casus belli is most unrealistic. Fachiri, Recognition of Foreign Laws by Municipal Courts,
12 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 95 (1931); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1088, 1089 (1941).
126. See cases cited note 31 supra.
127. It has often been recognized that many advantages would accrue to world trade
if courts could hear the merits of commercial claims against foreign sovereigns. See, e.g,,
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HAy. L. Rav. (14, 627
(1950) ; the Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). But more
rarely is there recognition of the broader, non-economic benefits that would result from
judicial remedies for all claims against foreign states. See LAUTER'AcHT, supra note 124,
at 240.
128. See note 120 supra and accompanying text; and see note 133 infra and acconi-
panying text.
129. "On general principles it is desirable that, so far as possible, controversies of a
judicial nature with foreign governments, whoever or whatever may be the opposing party,
should be submitted to a decision of the courts of the land where jurisdiction would ordi-




A statute is essential to the full implementation of this program in view of
its provision for liability of the United States under circumscribed circum-
stances 130 and its procedural 131 and other modifications. 1" 2 Legislation would
also have the advantage, as compared with executive or judicial action, of con-
stituting a relatively permanent pronouncement of American intention to ex-
tend its exercise of jurisdiction. The statute might express the willingness of
the United States to recognize liability to a similar extent in foreign courts.'-
Basic features of the proposed reform can be achieved even without Con-
gressional action. The State Department can announce adoption of the pro-
gram in the way that it announced the "restrictive theory."'^' And it can
communicate to foreign powers American readiness to accept reciprocal treat-
ment. Although the United States cannot be made a party to a suit without
statutory authorization, under the third interpretation of Hoffw;an,1'3 the
Department can at least confine the judicial bent for granting immunity to
situations where serious damage to foreign relations would occur. And before
"recognizing and allowing" immunity in such situations, it can attempt to
settle plaintiff's claim by obtaining a continuance.
The courts themselves can seize the initiative. Contrary to the vievs of
character, against a foreign government, should be pressed for settlement through diplo-
matic channels. The two governments who thus become parties to the controversy are
often not equal antagonists. The arguments advanced on either side are seldom free from
considerations that have no proper relation to the legal merits of the particular contro-
versy. The weaker Power is often at a disadvantage in discu-sing such claims with a
powerful sister nation whose good will it is important, for other reasons, to preserve un-
ruffled. W"hat should only be considered as an argument may sometimes assume the ap-
pearance of an ultimatum. Secret collateral and personal considerations often become in-
volved, especially when the advocates of private interests, acting independently, are in a
position to supplement the government's representation of their client's claim by whatever
ways and means may seem to them most properly adapted to that end." Brinton, Stsits
Against Foreign States, 25 A35. J. I:NTL L. S0, 62 (1931).
It is not improbable that Chief Justice Stone was referring to these less immediate
implications when he stated that it would be detrimental to the natinal interest for the
courts to decline jurisdiction without executive approval. See text at note 56 supra.
130. See p. 1167-S sz!pra; see also text at note 116 supra.
131. See notes 109 and 114 supra and accompanying text.
132. Eee notes 99 and 100 supra. Legislation would, of course, eliminate the reluc-
tance which courts have shown to curb the granting of immunity in the ahbscnce of Con-
gressional mandate. E.g., The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). And it would relieve the
State Department from having to influence judicial adiptkn ,:f a new anpr,,ach to im-
munity without giving the appearance of doing so. See, e.g., the Derartmcnts nnounce-
ment of the restrictive theory, partially quoted note 62 .mpra.
133. Incorporation in such a statute of the United States' readiness to accept recipro-
cal treatment before foreign courts would assure other nations that American action does
not stem from narrow nationalism.
134. See note 67 szpra.
135. See text at note 47 supra.
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pessimistic commentators 1=0 and judges, 37 courts are not bound to apply out-
worn doctrines until emancipated by legislation or by a long-overdue inter-
national convention. 138 International law is no more static than other law.'
0
Since the present immunity doctrines are of its own making, the Supreme
Court can alter them at its next opportunity by announcing prospective appli-
cation of the suggested policy.
CONCLUSION
The proposed statutory reform promises the fullest recognition of individual
rights compatible with friendly foreign relations and community fairness. It
grants relief for many otherwise unrequited wrongs, and it provides a method
whereby every subsequent restriction of domestic sovereign immunity will
produce a corresponding limitation of its international counterpart. The flexi-
bility of this approach preserves the advantages of the third interpretation of
Hoffman, leaving the State Department with responsibility for distinguishing
between sensitive and unimportant situations. But when the executive inter-
cedes, the plaintiff who most requires access to the courts-the tort victim-
is assured a judicial remedy. And even though one who contracts with for-
eign governments may occasionally be deprived of judicial recourse by "recog-
nition and allowance," the proposed approach permits him to obtain judgment
in many new instances. Furthermore, where diplomatic relations would suffer
from enforcement of judgments obtained against foreign governments in either
tort or contract, the United States as a whole pays the price of protecting
the national interest.
136. See, e.g., Jessup and Deiik, Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagstyrel-
sen et al, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 335 (1931). After discussing the Second Circuit's decision
granting immunity from execution to property of the Swedish Government, despite a valid
judgment against that Government, the authors concluded that: "the results are regret-
table and put the party who has a bona fide litigation with a foreign state under disadvan-
tages which can hardly be reconciled with modern concepts of fairness and justice. How-
ever, this anomalous situation cannot be remedied and full justice cannot be done in these
cases until some international conventional agreement lets down the bars." Id. at 339. For
a subsequent and less pessimistic view by Professor Jessup, see note 138 infra.
137. See, e.g., The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) ; The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1919).
138. Despite general agreement that the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity should
be modernized through international conventions, the only treaty attempting this has been
the Brussels Convention of 1926. But this only denied immunity to commercial vessels.
TREATY INFORMATION BuLL., No. 18 at 67 (U.S. Dep't State 1931) ; 3 HuosoN, INTEtt-
NATIONAL LEGISLATION 1837 (1931). And the United States has failed to adhere to this
treaty.
As Professor Jessup has pointed out, in the absence of a multipartite convention, courts
must continue to bear the burden of developing international law. Jessup, .-las the Supreme
Court Abdicated One of Its Functions s, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 168, 171-2 (1946).
139. In performing their function of creating and interpreting international law, courts
must remain sensitive to changing community values. "International law . . . has at times,
like the common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distin-
guishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests its
jural quality." Cardozo, J. in New Jersey v. Delaware, 291. U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
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